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THREE APPROACHES TO MODELING CORPORATE GAMES:
SOME OBSERVATIONS
by Ian Ayres*
It is a special honor to be able to comment on the excellent pa-
pers of Professors Gordon, Leebron and Shubik because these au-
thors have each previously taught me important things about game
theory and/or corporations. Like legions of other Yale students; I
audited part of Professor Shubik's game theory course in order to
learn from one of the modem masters of the field. And Professors
Gordon and Leebron are two of the reasons that Columbia Law
School has the strongest corporate group in the country. Professor
Gordon in particular has taught me much of what I know about
stock market efficiency.l
Professor Shubik, in his contribution to this symposium, divides
game-theoretic scholarship into three levels of mathematical sophis-
tication: high church, low church, and conversational.2 His tripar-
tite distinction is an especially useful place to begin analyzing the
papers of Shubik, Leebron and Gordon, because they are fine exam-
ples of each branch of the literature. Professor Shubik himself dis-
covered many of the techniques that dominate the high church
literature. His article introduces some of the more fundamental but
initially inaccessible results of explicit high church (or some econo-
mists alternatively use the jargon "high-brow") modeling.
Professor Leebron's paper is an excellent low church application
of several of these insights to a specific legal context. Leebron's use
of matrix and extensive form representations of what Shubik calls
the "information sausage"3 allows readers new to the field to see
these game theoretic techniques in action. And finally, Jeff
Gordon's analysis of the absolute delegation rule shows how a more
conversational approach to game theory can still reveal strategic in-
• Visiting Professor, Yale University Law School; Professor, Stanford Law School.
B.A., Yale University; Ph.D. (Economics), M.I.T.;J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to
thank Rob Gertner and Jeff Gordon for helpfUl comments.
I. See generally Jeffrey A. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information. and Securities Research 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (critiquing efficient
market hypothesis corporate law).
2. Martin Shubik, Game Theory. Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
285,298 (1991).
3. See David Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment and the Multinational Corporation. 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305 (1991); Martin Shubik,
Remark at Symposium - Just Winners and Losers: The Application of Game Theory to
Corporate Law and Practice, University of Cincinnati College of Law (Mar. I, 1991)
[hereinafter Shubik, Remark).
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teraction that may strongly affect optimal public policy. Gordon is
able to tell plausible narratives' without the heavy artillery of matri-
ces and game trees in part because he can refer to what, by now,
have become the well-accepted high and low church models of the
past. For example, Professor Gordon's discussion of cycling is
animated by the extensive literature that has grown up around the
well documented phenomenon. Gordon's paper shows that one of
the great contributions of conversational approaches is to identify
similarities between a new context and a well analyzed game. Once
the scholar discovers that a legal problem is analogous to the
prisoners' dilemma or the battle of the sexes,4 then the resulting
equilibrium can often be discussed without formally writing down
and solving an explicit model. In the following paragraphs, I will
provide brief and desultory observations about each of these works.
These comments are made in the same order that the papers were
presented at the symposium.
I. COMMENTS ON SHUBIK
One of the important theses of Professor Shubik's paper is his
discussion of the "solution" or "equilibrium" concept.5 Only in
game theory do modelers have to explicitly choose the equilibrium
concept that is most appropriate. Shubik succeeds in making
opaque what many law and economic scholars think is transparent.
Few law and economics theorists fret about whether they have cho-
sen the appropriate solution concept. But the very difficulty of mak-
ing assumptions about what sets of strategies will create stable
equilibrium makes the process of modeling much more contestable
- especially because other social scientists may be able to bring to
bear empirical information about how decision makers actually react
to various strategic situations.
The new advances in modeling dynamic games with incomplete
information underscore the importance of players' belief in support-
ing an equilibrium. Equilibrium concepts can place a variety of im-
portant restrictions on what beliefs players can have and how they
are updated. For example, game theory may turn out to be the final
vindication of Bayesian analysis. "Bayes law" is a controversial sta-
tistical relation that describes how rational decision makers would
update prior beliefs with new information. Bayesian analysis of evi-
4. The games are discussed in ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (1989). A
good example of how legal scholars can discover analogies to well-specified games, see
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International
Lawyers, 14 YALE]. INT'L. L. 335 (1989).
5. Shubik, supra note 2, at 293.
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dence has run into stiff opposition from legal scholars. Laurence
Tribe, for example, has a widely-cited law review article criticizing
the idea of applying Bayesian analysis to legal issues.6 Yet in game-
theoretic models, Bayesian updating is the standard assumption
which restricts the equilibrium beliefs that players have in latter
stages of the game after they witness how their opponents have
behaved.
As controversial as the assumption of Bayesian updating has been
for law and economic analysis, the choice of an equilibrium concept
has even more arbitrary dimensions relating to inferences drawn
from out-of-equilibrium behavior. That out-of-equilibrium behav-
ior is not supposed to occur allows modelers to advance a number
of "exotic refinements" to restrict players inferences.7 How people
react to things that should not happen can dramatically effect the
stability of an equilibrium. Game theorists have developed a
number of assumptions about what inferences people will draw
from unexpected, out-of-equilibrium behavior. For example, in an
asymmetric information game in which investors initially cannot tell
whether they are financing "good" or "bad" investment projects8 ,
what inference should an investor draw from a debt contract offer
that neither good or bad borrowers would make in equilibrium?
Some modelers assume "passive conjectures" so that prior beliefs
about the probability of dealing with a "good" project are un-
changed by the out of equilibrium behavior. Other modelers try to
assess whether one type would be more likely to make the particular
error that led to the out-of-equilibrium behavior and draw infer-
ences from that behavior accordingly. The non-robustness of the
models to these second order informational assumptions about the
solution concept reveal important subtleties in how we process in-
formation. Game theory shows that a wide variety of diverse behav-
ior can fly under the banner of rational decision-making when there
is incomplete or imperfect information. Which equilibrium concept
embodying these inferential assumptions most fully captures reality
is a question that may be best answered by other schools of social
sCIence.
Rob Gertner and I have argued that contract default rules should
be chosen by comparing the costs associated with different default
6. Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
7. See RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 112-14.
8. This investment model is analyzed more formally in my accompanying paper. Ian
Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 392-402
(1991).
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equilibria.9 Yet predicting the equilibrium of strategic bargaining
games of incomplete information will often turn on the equilibrium
concept that is assumed. Professor Shubik's article points out that
game theorists' choice of an equilibrium concept is an assumption
that - like other assumptions about information and order of play
- can be contested. Io Indeed, the choice of the appropriate solu-
tion concept may be one of the areas where non-game theorists have
the most to offer in refining the modeling practices of even high
church theorists.
II. COMMENTS ON LEEBRON
Professor Leebron's paper ably presents several models that ex-
emplify and apply the new game-theoretic techniques that are intro-
duced at a more abstract level by Professor Shubik. Here, I would
like to discuss two relationships between the pieces.
Like Professor Shubik, Leebron begins by emphasizing the impor-
tance in choosing the appropriate solution concept. He openly de-
fends his choice of a non-cooperative approach because externally
enforced contracts are not available in the international debt con-
text. But Professor Leebron errs in arguing that "most applications
of game theory to the law will involve the analysis of cooperative
games." II First, at a descriptive level, the vast majority of existing
game-theoretic treatments of legal issues have to date been almost
exclusively non-cooperative. 12 This includes the extensive literature
on trial settlements and the growing literature in contract negotia-
tion and bankruptcy. As a predictive matter, I believe that there are
technical reasons why future work will remain in the non-coopera-
tive framework. As a primary example, the non-cooperative models
have been more adept at handling problems of noncontractibility
and asymmetric information that are at the core of many legal
Issues.
While the defining aspect of cooperative games is the ability to
make binding commitments, the leading game-theoretic models of
bargaining and contracting are non-cooperative. In these models,
the binding, externally-enforced nature of the contractual commit-
ments are "black boxed" as binding payoffs for struck bargains.
The alternative cooperative framework for modeling bargaining
games, such as "split the dollar," proceeds by choosing axioms that
9. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 91 (1989).
10. See Shubik, supra note 2, at 288·90.
11. Leebron, supra note 3, at 309.
12. See Ayres, supra note 8, at 387 n.2.
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would characterize the agreements that players would anticipate
making with each other. Eric Rasmusen has given voice to some of
the misgivings that non-cooperative game-theorists have toward the
cooperativists axiomatic bent:
Although Nash's objective was simply to characterize the an-
ticipations of the players, I perceive a heavier note of morality
in cooperative game theory than in noncooperative game the-
ory. Cooperative outcomes are neat, fair, beautiful, and effi-
cient. . . . [N]oncooperative bargaining models . . . while
plausible, lack every one of those features. Cooperative game
theory may be useful for ethical decisions, but its attractive
features are inappropriate for most economic situations, and
the spirit of the axiomatic approach is very different from the
utility maximization of current economic theory.13
Rasmusen's open disavowal of the cooperativist approaches descrip-
tively captures the dominant approach of the theorists. But in the
end, the validity of cooperative and noncooperative solution con-
cepts will turn on empirical questions of human behavior. In the
end, it may be that cooperativists do better at explaining the world.
Noncooperative bargaining games usually lead to all or nothing re-
sults, with a single offer and acceptance. As an empirical matter, it is
possible that the equity axioms of the cooperative solution concepts
correspond more directly to reality.
There is a second interesting relationship between the Shubik and
Leebron papers. Leebron's discussion of the "golden goose"
game14 provides an interesting qualification to Shubik's favorite
bridge aphorism (delivered orally at the symposium) that "a peak is
worth two finesses".'5 Shubik's statement is true ex post, but the pos-
sibility of peaking ex post may make it difficult to find someone to
play against ex ante.
Leebron's model of foreign investment illustrates that allowing
the borrowing country to peak ex post - and discover the profitabil-
ity of the investment project - might make it difficult to secure in-
vestment ex ante. Consequently, the borrowing country may have ex
ante incentives to commit to ex post ignorance. Leebron's golden
goose game is part of an interesting class of models in which a
player can be made better off ex ante if it commits to ignorance ex
post.
Two examples of this include a variation on the classic prisoner's
dilemma game and a simple game of nuclear deterrence. In the
13. RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 231.
14. Leebron, supra note 3, at 321.
15. Shubik, Remark, supra note 3.
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prisoners' dilemma case, prisoners might have an incentive to hire
the same lawyer and instruct the lawyer only to pass on settlement
offers which offer identical deals to both prisoners. By precommit-
ting through joint counsel to ignorance, the prisoners can thus miti-
gate their incentives to fink on each other. 16
In the nuclear deterrence context, imagine that the United States
and the Soviet Union have nuclear delivery capabilities that become
inoperative randomly 10% of the time - because, for example, the
B-52s are getting pretty old. If the other side knows when the
planes are inoperative, then half-the-world becomes a very danger-
ous place because there is no effective deterrence during these
down times. Ifit is equally possible that either side's weapon system
could become inoperative first, then rational arms control policy
might mandate commitments to ignorance. Treaties against U-2
flights or the construction of satellites or AWACs planes could in-
crease security by impairing intelligence. Counter to Reagan's fa-
mous couplet, sometimes it is in our best interest to "trust and not
verify."
Finally, I should add that Leebron's golden goose game provides
several testable implications. If insuring ex post ignorance is impor-
tant to ex ante investment incentives, we might. see investment
projects skewed.toward those whose knowledge about ex post profit-
ability was easier to shield - so as to maintain ex post asymmetric
information. This might imply, for example, a bias toward more
risky projects. Projects whose returns have a low expected variance
will have inherently little asymmetric information because the differ-
ence between the upper tail and lower tail is so small.
III. COMMENTS ON GORDON
Professor Gordon's paper offers. several innovative explanations
for a specific corporate phenomena - the absolute delegation rule
in publicly traded corporations.!' While he offers reasons why
shareholder voting on corporate policies is likely to be efficient, 18
his explanations have equal force with regard to director voting in
corporations that have cumulative voting. This is because the same
costs of inefficient cycling and rent-seeking can infect the voting of
minority representatives on a cumulatively elected board. Thus, his
16. See Pam Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992).
17. See Jeffrey Gordon, Shareholder Initiative and Delegation: A Social Choice and Game
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 351-52 (1991).
18. Id. at 353.
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argument also provides strong evidence for the d.ecline of cumula-
tive voting regimes in publicly held corporations. 19
While Professor Gordon provides plausible explanations for the
broad existence of the absolute delegation rule, I think that there is
more work to be done to suggest whether the current rule is opti-
mally tailored. Even accepting many of Professor Gordon's argu-
ments, one might still argue that the absolute delegation rule:
(a) goes too far - because there are less restrictive alterna-
tives that can prevent the strategic inefficiencies; or
(b) doesn't go far enough - because the same inefficiencies
that infect shareholder initiative voting also may infect share-
holder votes in electing boards of directors.
Both these criticisms take as correct Professor Gordon's basic argu-
ments. Yet the possibility of strategic inefficiencies may be con-
strained with a more tailored response, or else may entail a broader
ban against shareholder voting for boards of directors.
Although Professor Gordon discusses the possibility of a less re-
strictive alternative with regard to a potential anti-greenmail rule,20
it is possible that the individual problems attributed to shareholder
voting initiatives could be handled with other discrete rules. For
example, the heterogeneous preferences concerning payouts and
the inefficient cycling that might ensue might be constrained by a
rule prohibiting shareholder votes about how or when profits
should be distributed, so that Transamerica type problems would not
arise.21
Moreover, initiatives actuated by ancillary profits that sharehold-
ers could gain - from, say, the placement of a new factory - could
be constrained by the same kind of conflict of interest rules that con-
strain director participation in self-interested board votes.
These rules might be evaded. Professor Gordon details the diffi-
culty in enforcing an anti-greenmail rule, when a shareholder like H.
Ross Perot doesn't actually propose an initiative. And it is possible
that disinterested "straws" could propose initiatives on behalf of in-
19. The failure of corporations to allow shareholders to supervise managerial
decisions might also be compared to the refusal of corporations 10 allow courts or other
stakeholders to supervise managerial decisions. The courts are largely denied oversight
by operation of the business judgement rule. Other stakeholders in the nexus of
contracts (bondholders,' employees) fail to contraci for much voice or control.
Sometimes, the bondholders exercise some control through bond indenture covenants,
but seldom contract for the right of ex post initiatives. The decline of the purpose clause
requirement might be seen as a way that shareholders have given away even this form of
ex ante managerial supervision.
20. Gordon, supra note 17, at 383.
21. [d.
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terested shareholders. But even leaky buckets can carry some water.
Not surprisingly, it becomes an empirical question about whether
less restrictive alternatives might provide more effective corporate
governance.
Even if Professor Gordon is correct that less restrictive alterna-
tives are not cost effective, then his proof that shareholder voting
can generate strategic inefficiencies may prove too much. For,
although Professor Gordon refers to the current rule as an absolute
delegation doctrine, the current rule may not go far enough in dis-
enfranchising shareholders from corporate governance. The same
species of strategic inefficiencies that infect shareholder voting on
specific policy issues could also infect shareholder voting on elect-
ing the board of directors. Carl leahn, for example, has sought rep-
resentation on the board of directors and the costs of inefficient
cycling, bargaining and greenmail threats could be at playas share-
holder factions vie to have their initiatives undertaken by the elected
board members.
Professor Gordon's analysis might suggest that the traditional im-
mutable state law requirement of yearly elections might not maxi-
mize firm value. His theory might be extended to explain the
growth of staggered elections as firms try even further to reduce the
importance of shareholder voting. If the strategic concerns that
Professor Gordon has identified are especially costly, shareholders
may prefer to make their delegation to management even more ab-
solute by giving up their election rights. It is possible that the threat
of hostile takeover is sufficient to discipline incumbent manage-
ment. Under this scenario, managers could only be removed from
office through pre-specified takeover conditions analogous to a
freeze-out merger.
These two broad points - that the current delegation rules might
not go far enough or might go too far - again underscore the em-
pirical nature of Professor Gordon's claim. An absolute rule is only
efficient if it on net provides benefits both with respect to less re-
strictive rules that allow more initiatives and with respect to an even
more absolute rule which forbade even shareholder votes on elec-
tion of directors.
CONCLUSION
The legal academy has a long tradition of preferring a priori theo-
retical arguments. Whether this is because theory pieces are easier
to generate and consequently provide a bigger "bang for the buck"
in careerist terms, or because legal scholars and lawyers are often
poorly trained in empirical matters is difficult to assess. But descrip-
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tively, the legal academy has been resistant to varying degrees to the
empiricism of the realists and then to the law and society movement.
Perversely, game-theoretic approaches to law, which are if anything
more theoretically abstract and reductivist, may serve to push legal
discussion back toward empiricism. As my observations on these
three excellent papers have illustrated, the pathological "possibil-
ity" theorems that strategic games produce push us as legal scholars
to ask if the possible is empirically the "probable" or the "actual".
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